The problem of climate change has attracted international attention mainly because of its cross-border effects and the impossibility of solving the problem by a few nations. The delay in combating climate change is attributable to various factors including polarized interests among nations. On the other hand, the Montreal Protocol (ozone depletion) regime has managed to balance and reconcile the interests of both the global South and the global North towards a common goal. Even if some differences exist between the two problems, lessons from the ozone depletion regime can inform the climate regime and enhance the participation of developing nations without adversely affecting their interests. The lessons include a sequential approach [i.e. addressing the most critical issue -emission from developed countries -first], increased participation and compliance, improved financial assistance and technology transfer regimes and enhanced political commitment to climate change. These lessons are in tune with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities which should facilitate a meaningful participation from developing countries in the climate change regime.
Introduction
Environmental problems are increasingly becoming the subject of global concern owing to their cross-border effects, and because it is also impossible for one or a few nations to solve these problems on their own. 1 However, a global consensus on how to solve these environmental problems and define the respective obligations of nations is not easy.
2 Ozone layer depletion and climate change are typical examples in this regard.
The achievements in the climate change and ozone depletion regimes are not comparable. The ozone depletion regime is "recognized as a landmark accord in the most effective international environmental regime to date" 3 and it is frequently "hailed as the most successful environmental treaty ever devised," 4 In contrast, the climate change regime has continued to be in "the forefront of public debate" for its failure to bring about effective solutions. 5 Thus, many 1 This is best described by the principles of 'interdependency of ecosystem', 'common concern of mankind', and 'common heritage of mankind' all calling for the global cooperation. successful elements of the ozone depletion regime, including the negotiation process and devices used to ensure the participation and meaningful contribution of developing nations, could perhaps serve as a model for future climate change negotiations. 6 The traditional North-South divide, which presents enormous challenges to the adoption of many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) due to economic disparities, is one of the reasons for the delays that have occurred in fighting climate change. 7 However, the Montreal Protocol regime, which deals with ozone layer depletion, is considered by many as a breakthrough in many respects, partially because it managed to balance and reconcile the interests of both the developing South and the developed North and brought both groups together to achieve a common goal. 8 Based on scholarly literature, international agreements, decisions and reports, and other empirical data, this article assesses the kinds of lessons one can draw from the Montreal Protocol regime for application to the developing climate change regime. In particular, it addresses the ways in which the interests and commitments of the developing and developed nations were balanced by the Montreal regime.
Section 1 highlights the origin and features of ozone depletion and climate change and further explores the actions taken by the international community to address these environmental hazards including the negotiations, challenges encountered and the degree of success attained in the two regimes. The second section of the article focuses on the concerns raised by developing countries and their reasons for claiming preferential treatment in MEAs, the mechanisms devised by the Montreal regime to address these concerns, and the degree of success such mechanisms have had. Moreover, some differences and similarities of the two regimes are discussed with a view to identifying the lessons that contributed to the success of the Montreal regime. Section 3 assesses the lessons that can safely be applied to the climate regime through global consensus that requires enhanced participation of developing nations without adversely affecting their interests. Hence, a sequential approach [addressing the The scientific evidence accumulated over more than three decades shows that human-produced chemicals, called ozone depleting substances (hereafter "ODSs"), like chlorofluorocarbons (hereafter "CFCs") and halons, are responsible for the observed depletions of the ozone layer.
14 Scientific uncertainty about its harm and cause, unequal contribution by nations, potentially high transition costs and unavailability of alternatives to the many uses of ODSs, unequal capacity to bear the cost of providing relief, and the global nature of the problem that deserves national cooperation were some of the challenges surmounted to bring about a regulatory multilateral environmental treaty. 15 Yet, several countries and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") called for an international action towards a precautionary approach in the protection of the atmosphere, 16 which later on resulted in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention hereafter) in 1985. 17 The convention did not include specific provisions and commitments regarding ODSs and it did not even determine which substances are responsible for ozone depletion mainly owing to the scientific uncertainties and economic factors. Yet, it has played a significant role in establishing a legal framework and setting the basic principles for subsequent negotiations. 18 The Vienna Convention, together with advanced scientific findings and human understanding of the threat ultimately paved the way for the development of the Montreal Protocol and the subsequent amendments and adjustments.
http://www.epa.gov/Ozone/science/effects/index.html/ last visited on September 10,2011. 14 
UNEP, (2005). Backgrounder: Basic Facts and Data on the Science and Politics of
Ozone Protection, at 1; see also, The United Nations Ozone Secretariat UNEP, 17 Green, supra note 5; Hunter et al, supra 14, at 578. 18 Id.
The Montreal Protocol is built upon the principles of 'Precaution' and 'Common but Differentiated Responsibility,' and it has addressed the gaps in the Vienna Convention. 19 More importantly, the Protocol has created institutional mechanisms that would adjust commitment levels and payoff structures in response to unforeseen developments without requiring new renegotiation. 20 Since 1987, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have successfully negotiated six amendments or/and adjustment documents commensurate with the advancement in scientific knowledge about ozone depletion. 21 Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator to the Montreal Protocol, acknowledged that the Montreal Protocol was designed to be flexible, "to be reopened and adjusted as needed, on the basis of the periodically scheduled scientific, economic, environmental, and technological assessments." 22 The Montreal Protocol regime is considered as an exciting success. 23 The total number of controlled substances reached 96 24 assessment report shows that the depleted ozone was showing signs of recovery. 25 It is also estimated that with continued compliance with the current control measures of the Protocol, global average ozone is expected to return to pre-1980 levels by about 2050. 26 The regime also "[s]ecured an aggregate 95% reduction in production and consumption of all ozone-depleting substances" thereby achieving "a measurable reduction in tropospheric and stratospheric levels of many ozone-depleting substances." 27 The cost incurred in its mitigation is much lower than the benefit gained in terms of avoided human and material losses. 28
Climate Change
When the heat that comes from the sun is radiated back by the earth's surface to the atmosphere, greenhouse gases (GHG) 29 The effects of climate change include increase in global mean temperature [commonly referred to as global warming], increase in global precipitation in many parts of the world, and precipitation decrease in the sub-tropics, such as the Sahel in Africa, and increase in frequency or intensity of climate extremes such as floods, drought and tropical cyclone. 33 Scientists strongly suggest that we should not let global temperatures rise by more than 2ºC to 2.5ºC total above pre-industrial levels for mitigating these sufferings.
34
With an increased public awareness and enhanced concern about climate change, the international dialogue initiated by the UN and other international organizations 35 has resulted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. 36 As an interim measure, UNFCCC imposed a 37 The Convention also calls on developed countries to "take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof." 38 The Convention balances the economic growth needs of developing nations while combating climate change. To this end, it seeks financial assistance from developed nations so that developing countries can meet "the agreed full costs incurred by developing country parties in complying with their obligations" and the full incremental costs of technology transfer. 39 The fact that it was initially signed by 161 countries, and has now been ratified by 195, shows that there is "a strong foundation for future international binding agreements to address climate change. On the other hand, negotiations and meeting of parties continued on a postKyoto regulation which aims at strengthening emission reduction commitments, which would include the US and some high-emitter developing nations, like China and India. 48 Very recently, the parties at the Copenhagen Conference of 2009, failed to meet expectations and they only agreed on a non-binding instrument called the Copenhagen Accord, also known as 'a letter of intent'. 49 The traditional North-South dichotomy was evident in the Copenhagen Conference where China called upon the USA to live up to its obligation assumed by the UNFCCC in significantly reducing emission and providing financial assistance to the developing nations, while the US called for developing nations to assume their own commitments.
50
Despite all these efforts, the existing climate regime still lacks at least (1) a binding emission reduction schedule for nations, including reduced emissions from deforestation sector of the economy'; Emissions trading, on the other hand, permits an Annex B party to 'buy' emissions reduction credits, in the form of assigned amounts units from another Annex B party where it considers this is more cost-effective or cheaper for it rather than to undertake the reduction domestically. Stavins It is true that, historically speaking, developing countries contributed little or nothing to environmental problems, like ozone depletion and climate change. 55 For instance, developed countries with less than 25% of the world's population were consuming 88% of the CFCs, which is over 20 times the per capita consumption of the developing countries. 56 Similarly, developed countries are responsible for two-thirds of global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in 1993. 57 Although there is a higher emission growth in some developing nations like China, India and Brazil in their pursuits "to meet their social and development needs", per capita carbon emissions are still lower compared to the developed world. 58 Perhaps the long atmospheric lifetime of these ODSs and GHGs creates certain moral and historical responsibilities for the developed nations. 59 Hence, developing nations claim that developed countries are disproportionately responsible for creating ozone depletion and climate change problems, and they should take the lead in devising the solutions as well. 60 This principle of equity leads to the argument that developed nations have attained their economic growth by using ODSs and GHGs and the same opportunity 55 Margaret M. Pinkham, (1991 should be granted to developing nations. 61 For this reason, during the negotiation of the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in 1990, India's Environmental Minister claimed that the North "had usurped India's 'opportunity' to develop CFC production" and should pay compensation for the same.
62
The other related concern of developing nations is the fear that stringent environmental responsibilities might retard their economic growth and development. 63 It has been noted that, "there exists a hierarchy of human needs in developing countries by which needs for food, clothing, and shelter take priority over social and aesthetic needs." 64 That means, when a developing country is struggling to meet the basic needs of its population, " [p] olicies to protect the environment may not be feasible for a country dealing with overpopulation, malnutrition, and lack of basic sanitation." 65 They went far in considering some environmental regimes, like the Montreal Protocol Regime, as an instrument for the developed nations to subvert their economic development. 67 The developing world is unwilling to pursue life without using the products that have ODSs, which make life much easier in its many uses. 68 Likewise, there is a strong correlation between current levels of development and GHG emission. 69 Early industrialization results in higher emissions, which has brought current prosperity to the developed world but not yet to the developing world. 70 That is why developing nations "have not yet accepted any requirement through climate negotiation that will [may] slow down their economic growth." 71 Yet they cannot pursue polluting the environment as "consensus has emerged that the planet can withstand little more of these externalities or has hit some sort of tipping point."
72
This hesitation seems rational and morally coherent when one observes that developing countries simply do not have the resources to practice environment friendly economic growth due to factors such as the tremendous cost of reducing GHG emission or adaptation to it. These same costs even intimidate the wealthy nations like the US. 73 Thus, the financial and technical incapability of developing countries to respond to climate change problems or produce or buy the relatively expensive alternatives to ODS is a point of concern. For instance, studies revealed that accelerated phase-out schedule of methyl bromide might take away a substantial portion of food supply in developing countries. 74 Hence, the fact that many of the developing countries do not have the research resources to develop alternatives, and that most of the research is occurring in the industrialized nations render it extremely difficult to subject both groups to similar phase-out schedules. 75 Another argument that developing countries put forth is the "polluter pays principle." 76 The principle suggests that the industrialized nations have caused the problems of pollution, and "they should pay the developing countries to avoid making the same development decisions that would further contribute to the problem."
77 For instance, in the methyl bromide debate, this principle requires developed countries to provide assistance to find alternatives so that the developing countries can continue to develop without compromising their food supply. 78 After recognizing that the industrialized nations are responsible for most of the damage on the atmosphere, 79 Singer claims that: "as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed nations broke it. If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere." 80 74 Lee Anne Duval, supra note 16. Methyl bromide is powerful ozone depleting substance or pesticide used in the control of pest insects, nematodes, weeds, pathogens, and rodents in agricultural productions equally in use in developing and developed nations. Developing countries, however, claimed that banning of methyl bromide before finding its right and economically viable substitute will benefit only the developed north where their companies will sell the expensive substitute at the price which is only affordable to their farmers. 75 Rather than stemming from disregard for the global environment, developing nations' reticence in assuming responsibility stems from priorities, 81 and lack of financial resources associated with attaining the abatement standards central to many multilateral agreements. 82 Such requests of the developing nations that MEAs should consider their special situations 83 brought about the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' into the MEAs which has contributed to the success of the Montreal Regime. 84 The contribution of this principle in the efforts to combat global ozone depletion and in the protection of the interests of developing countries is highlighted below.
Mechanisms Devised by the Ozone Layer Regime
There are multiple factors behind the success stories of the Montreal regime that can be transferred to other regimes. These factors include international scientific cooperation and consensus, an incremental policy process, the targets and timetables approach, involvement of multilateral institutions, and more effective manifestations of the common but differentiated responsibility principle. 85 Above all, the meaning given to the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' is central for the inclusion of developing countries and for the success of the regime. 86 In the context of the Montreal Protocol, one aspect of this principle is to allow developing countries to delay the implementation of control measures, 87 
More Flexible Freeze and Phase-out Schedules
The Montreal Protocol regime recognized the special situation of developing countries in their pursuits to meet its basic domestic needs and their compliance was offered a grace period of ten years as long as it does not "exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita."
89 Hence, the most significant ODSs were scheduled for phase-out in 1996 in the developed countries but only in 2010 in developing countries, otherwise known as Article 5 Parties. 90 In addition, Article 5 Parties were required to freeze the use of methyl bromide in 2002, leading to phase-out in 2015 and HCFCs in 2016 and phased out in 2040, which is at least ten years later than the timeline for the developed nations.
91 With regard to the calculation of its baseline "…either the average of its annual calculated level of consumption for the period of 1995 to 1997 inclusive or a calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower" was considered. However, the baseline for developed countries was mostly the calculated level of consumption in 1986.
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The period of grace is intended to allow developing countries to provide for their basic domestic needs during the transition away from ODSs and to enable them learn from the experience gained in the developed countries in the course of implementing the Montreal Protocol regime. 93 However, there were challenges in the implementation of the grace period. For instance, US farmers requested that "methyl bromine is necessary for them to compete with developing countries" and successfully lobbied for its continued use in the name of exemptions past the 2005 deadline. 94 The other challenge was the critique that the grace period granted to developing countries in the production and use of ODSs while the consumption freezes in developed nations increases the traffic of illegal trade. benefited from the flexible freeze and phase-out schedules that were designed in the ozone layer regime to the benefit of developing countries.
Financial Assistance
The Montreal Protocol's London Amendment in June 1990 created the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol. 96 It has the general objective of helping developing countries to comply with their obligations under the Protocol to phase out the use of ODSs at an agreed schedule 97 and the fund finances activities mandated to decrease production and consumption of ODSs. 98 In order to make financing available before the entry into force of the London Amendment, the parties also agreed to establish an Interim Fund, which became effective on January 1, 1991. 99 The Fund was a financial mechanism which embodied the principle that countries have a common but differentiated responsibility to protect and manage the global commons. 100 It is managed by an Executive Committee with an equal representation of seven industrialized and seven Article 5 Parties, which are elected annually by a meeting of the parties. 101 Financial and technical assistance is provided in the form of grants or concessional loans and is delivered through its implementing agencies. 102 The Fund, which is replenished seven times every three years, receives monetary contributions from industrialized member nations (Non-Article 5 Parties) based upon the United Nations Scale of Assessment. 103 It finances activities like project preparation, training and capacity building programs, technical assistance, information exchange, demonstration projects, institutional strengthening, small investment projects, and industrial conversion. 104 It, however, funds only the additional (the so-called 'incremental') 105 costs incurred in converting to non-ODS technologies.
106 .
The Fund has been an integral part of the success of the Montreal Protocol. The establishment of the Fund in 1990 persuaded many developing countries, like China and India, to join the combat against ozone depletion.
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Up to 2008, the Executive Committee has approved over USD 2.6 billion to finance over 6,700 projects and activities in 145 countries.
108
The implementation of these projects "will result in the phase-out of the consumption of more than 254,687 ODP tons and the production of about 176,439 ODP tons of ODSs". 
Parties.
110 Ethiopia has benefited from the Fund, and so far out of the approved amount of USD 605,067, USD 375,810 has been disbursed to Ethiopia. 111 Therefore, the Multilateral Fund has contributed to the phase-out of ODSs by encouraging the participation of developing countries and sponsoring domestic capacity-building exercises and by creating the sense of cooperation and commitment amongst the parties. 
Technology Transfer
Due to the lack of a strong clause in the original Montreal Protocol, 113 Article 5 Parties, led by India, China and Brazil requested technology transfer schemes to be "available on a preferential and non-commercial basis" and further requested developed nations to go to the extent of changing their laws for its effectiveness.
114 Developed nations, however, objected that they could not compel their industries to transfer technology on a non-commercial basis, and proposed that technology will only be transferred to countries that respect intellectual property rights, and through joint ventures and licensing arrangements. 115 In the end, the London Amendment was a compromise of these two conflicting interests, 116 and is considered as "the first treaty where developed countries accepted their responsibility for protecting the environment by assisting developing countries with technology transfers". 120 With the collaboration of German, Indian, and Swiss governments, the Ecofrig Project helped Indian companies to acquire the necessary knowledge and replace the CFCs that were used in its refrigeration industry with new non-CFC equipment. 121 Hence, effective implementation of the technology transfer regime helped developing nations to comply with their commitment without much cost and allowed developed nations to achieve their common goal. These are some of the factors that have had direct impact on the inclusion of developing nations thereby contributing to the success of the ozone regime. Other factors such as the comparative advantage of US companies over others and the green business movements by private actors have contributed to the success of the ozone regime.
Differences and Similarities between the Ozone Layer and Climate Change Regimes
Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are the two most significant environmental challenges facing the world today. 122 In spite of the ambitious global plan to reverse these environmental harms, the degree of government cooperation and the fundamental change that is required in human economic and 122 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 303. The fact that ozone layer will not return to its pre 1980s status before 2050 and the need for continuous compliance to the regime makes stratospheric ozone depletion a significant environmental concern even today.
social behavior render ozone depletion addressable while climate change remains contentious.
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One of the common features of the two issues is the need for multilateral action to protect global commons. 124 Even if the contribution of developing nations is minimal in both cases as the source of the problems, the regime will not succeed without meaningful participation of developing nations. 125 Consequently, the inclusion of developing nations for effective international ozone depletion or climate change regulation is not an option.
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The other similar characteristic is the unequal contribution by developed and developing countries, which further complicates the global response. 127 Hence, both present contentious issues of international (intra-generational) equity in that developed countries are the primary contributors to both environmental problems and therefore, should assume predominant roles in mitigation efforts. 128 This, then, requires a meaningful and advanced participation of developed nations not only in mitigating the direct cause of these environmental problems but also providing financial assistance and technology transfer to developing nations in their pursuits to curb the common problem. 129 Likewise, the economic ability of developing nations to effectively deal with these environmental problems and their current priority in providing basic means to citizens are common concerns of the regimes. 130 As a result, developing nations pledge to assume lower or no binding responsibilities in mitigating the problems.
131
It is to be noted that both environmental concerns involve the 'tragedy of the commons' where some states 'free ride' on the efforts of others by benefiting 123 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2. 124 Id, at 2; Jasmine Abdel-khalik, (2001 128 Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 303. Added is the intergenerational equity raised on both problems due to the long life span of the anthropogenic emission and their long effect. Hence, the future generation is expected to suffer much unless the current generation makes meaningful sacrifice for the benefit of the future generation. See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 3. 129 See, John Ntambirweki, supra note 65. 130 See, Id. 131 Id, at 912 from the significant costs borne by parties that comply with their obligations. 132 Hence, any solution to these problems has to deal with the tendency of states to 'free ride' on the benefits accrued from mitigating actions of other states, and the solutions are also accompanied by the uncertainty whether other parties to a binding agreement will actually observe their commitments. 133 Lack of practical alternatives to the various uses of ODSs and energy consumption during the early period of negotiations were challenges which, inter alia, necessitated the participation of corporations. Ultimately, scientific and technological advances have shown viable alternatives to replace coal and fossil fuels while still producing the requisite amount of energy. 134 Although these technologies are environmentally friendly and economically feasible, the ultimate objectives of scaling them up, bringing them to the market and replacing the existing coal and fossil fuel energy involve further tasks and sustained testing. 135 In spite of the differences, the global responses to the problems of ozone depletion and climate change problems also share some common features, which include: enhanced scientific cooperation and involvement in the negotiations, an incremental approach and the creation of targets and timetables, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", and multiple mechanisms to encourage and assist the participation of developing countries.
Yet, there are important differences among the two that, partly, contribute to the different success stories of the regimes.
Climate change is a much more difficult phenomenon to regulate because it is more scientifically complex than ozone depletion and is still characterized by high scientific uncertainty and sharp asymmetrical vulnerabilities. 137 This plagues global efforts to reach consensus on lasting climate change alleviation. 138 There is more convincing scientific evidence about climate change today than during the Kyoto negotiations. However, some scientific uncertainty still remains to show the causation between emissions and large visible environmental problems. 139 Scientific uncertainty and causation had also delayed the ozone regime until overwhelming evidence, e.g. ozone hole, was found in 1985 to show stronger causation between CFCs/ODS and ozone depletion. 140 In spite of the delay in levels of certainty regarding the causation in global warming, many scientific data and reports, including that of IPCC, are now strongly filling the gap in evidence and they seem to nearly irrefutable, 141 or are becoming a "smoking gun," 142 soon to be followed by a growing consensus on the need to act swiftly and strongly. 143 The other, and perhaps the most important difference, is the fact that climate change mitigation affects core global economic activity which inherently involves issues of competition between nations. 144 Specifically, climate change alleviation implicates multiple sectors of the global economy, particularly those that have, throughout modern history, served as the backbone to industrial growth and development, making the cost of mitigation tough to bear. 145 The use of ODSs was confined to a relatively small amount of products, like refrigerators, fire extinguishers, foam, etc. whereas greenhouse gas emissions arise from nearly all areas of modern life. As a result, any approach to climate change has wider and more significant economic implications than the global efforts to combat ozone depletion, both for developed and developing nations. 146 Hence, mitigating the effects of climate change is accompanied by "unprecedented challenges, because it can only be achieved through extraordinary changes in the production and consumption of energy, thus affecting virtually all areas of economic activity." 147 A related aspect is the imbalance between "total costs of greenhouse-gasemission abatement and total benefits of avoided undesirable consequences of global warming." 148 In making the choice between continuing GHG emission and abating emission, countries will obviously choose to do that which presents a higher payoff. 149 It is worth of note that developing nations that do not contribute much for the problem will be affected severely by the consequences of climate change more than the developed nations. 150 Conversely, developed nations that caused the depletion of the ozone layer were the most to be affected by its effects. 151 Hence, the incentive and cost-benefit analysis of combating climate change is quite different from that of ozone depletion even among developed nations. In spite of the underlying differences between the two problems, lessons drawn from the ozone regime can be adapted and applied towards future achievements and successes in the climate change regime. 153 We cannot, however, address the challenges in the climate change regime through a perfunctory application of the schemes used under the ozone regime, but by means of a tailored and pragmatic approach that considers the special circumstances of climate change problems discussed above.
Lessons for the Climate Change Regime
According to Thoms, the inherent nature of the climate change problem, including factors that are beyond the control of international negotiators "has weakened domestic support, strengthened opposition from industry and developing nations, turned the United States into a reluctant participant in international negotiations, and undermined negotiators' ability to implement trade restrictions."
154 Hence, given all the challenges faced by climate change negotiators, some even consider the emission reduction scheme reached so far as a remarkable success. 155 Nonetheless, as highlighted below, the climate change regime can benefit from several factors that contributed to the success of the ozone regime with a view to accommodating and enhancing the meaningful participation of developing nations in the global pursuits to address the problem of climate change. 156 negative net benefit. It is noted as well that there are some developed nations, such as Canada and Russia, who are net beneficiary of the climate change due to the effects of increased temperatures and precipitation on agricultural production. Scott Berrett describes that "The USA failed to participate (at least in part) because the costs of participation were high. Other countries agreed to participate (at least in part) because the costs to them of participating were low (as is true for some EU states), zero (as is true for all non-Annex I states) or even negative (as is true for the states given 'hot air' allowances). The Annex I countries likely to have the hardest time complying (Canada and Japan) agreed to participate only on the condition that their initial reduction obligations be diluted." Cumberlege, supra note 6, at 327, quoting, Scott Barrett, (2003 
Sequential Approach to Developing Nations
One of the basic factors that contribute to the low-level of success of the climate change regime is the North-South dichotomy regarding 'who-first, when, and how much' in emission abating. Negotiators in the ozone regime solved this problem through mostly separate commitments of industrialized and developing nations with a sequential inclusion of parties. 157 The more urgent issue of reaching binding controls on industrialized nations was resolved in the Montreal Protocol which also set the terms of future developing nations' participation (binding reductions with a ten-year implementation delay and the possibility of increased CFC production in the interim), followed by trade restrictions to assure compliance and enhance participation. 158 The negotiators finally provided developing nations with the necessary incentives through a combination of trade restrictions and financial and technological transfers to ensure their participation in the ozone regime.
159
Some urge that the 'inclusive' approach should be pursued in the climate change regime where developing nations are required to fully participate in the regime. 160 Other writers, nonetheless, suggest that negotiators of climate change should adopt a sequential approach to the inclusion of industrialized and developing nations, for it is imperative to bind the most immediate source of the problem first -the industrialized nations -and then turn to the secondary issue of participation by developing nations. 161 Otherwise, as has been witnessed in past negotiations, discussions may become bogged down and issues polarized. 162 It is equally significant to resolve the reluctance of some industrialized nations in assuming responsibility under the pretext of equal participation by developing 157 Id, at 838. 158 Id. 159 Wettestad, supra note 136, at 143. 160 For instance, the US Senate, in the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, decided unanimously (95-0) for similar treatment of industrialized and developing countries in any climate change agreement and the existing short-term developing country's' participation through the CDM is short of the criteria required by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Stavins and Berrett, supra note 36, at 11-12; see also Steinar Andresen, (1998). 161 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 844. 162 For instance, the Byrd-Hagel resolution of US Senate comes before Kyoto negotiation affecting the interest and offers of negotiators to the protocol. Similarly, negotiating coalition strengthened with the formation of G-77 plus China that have a force to block the success of any agreement unless their interests are well considered. See Id, at 839-840 and 844; Peter Newell, (2000). Climate for Change, Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse 9, at 13-18.
nations by ensuring that developing nations would eventually join and agree to binding restrictions, which will allay the competitiveness concerns.
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Yet the existing flexible mechanisms devised under the Kyoto Protocol do not efficiently address the competing interests involved in the climate change regime nor do they effectively enable a sequential approach to state participation (mostly due to regulatory uncertainties). 164 Hence, Thoms proposes that the flexibility mechanisms should be exclusive and only those developing nations that join the regime should benefit from these schemes. 165 This does not, however, entirely relieve developing countries from responsibilities and commitments because the high and rapidly growing GHG emissions of developing nations, which is different in degree from the ozone regime, creates a challenge for strictly applying the sequential approach followed in the ozone regime. One way of overcoming this challenge is determining equitable allocation of commitments based on the Human Development Index (HDI) combined with historic GHG emissions, energy use increases needed to improve low HDI and associated human poverty indices, and the efficiency with which energy is used, instead of per capita emissions that dominate the current negotiation. 166 Thus, the average of the present per 163 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 845. A very typical example is USA's position towards Kyoto Protocol.. 164 Of course, it provides automatic incentives for participation by some developing nations without direct financial input from parties Thus, at the Buenos Aires conference, Argentina became the first developing nation to assume binding targets and timetables for controlling emissions. Similarly, nations such as Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama have joined the protocol to become "emissions entrepreneurs," profiting from the protocol's joint implementation and clean development mechanisms. Seth Dunn, (1998). Can the North and South Get in
Step?, World Watch, Nov./Dec.; see also William Stevens, (1998). Deadline Set to Form Rules for Reducing Gas Emissions, Sun-Sentinel Fort Lauderdale, at 11; Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 845. 165 It is noted that "unless industrialized nations are certain that they will enter into effect and thereby induce involvement by developing nations, they will be reticent to agree to an approach that initially excludes the South. Similarly, unless developing nations are assured that the mechanisms will be implemented, they will not have the incentive to join the agreement." Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 845. 166 It is much easier for developing countries to argue on the basis of per capita emission which is difficult to be accepted by the developed North. On a per capita basis, the historic emissions of the United States (about 1,100 tons per person) are greater than those of China (about 66 tons per person) and India (about 23 tons per person). Though the gross footprints of some of developing countries are growing rapidly, the United States (20.4 tons per person) emits far more per person than China (3.8) or India (1.2). The per capita allocation have negative consequence like discouraging capita emissions of each country and the potential capacity of a country for future per capita emissions can be considered.
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This scheme transforms the current North-South blocks into three groups of countries, i.e. high emitter developed countries, low emitter developing countries, and high emitter developing countries, and they can all benefit according to their own marginal cost of mitigating climate change. 168 For instance, countries with low emission allocations would be forced to utilize the flexible mechanisms by carrying out development projects in countries with high emission entitlements while poor low carbon emitting countries would derive economic development benefits through CDM options. 169 Likewise, middle nations, such as China and India, would still have the ability to grow, and could use the available emission credit to attract significant capital investment from developed countries. 
Enhance Participation and Compliance
The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by 191 countries and seems to have maintained very high participation of nations.
171 Yet, the production of GHGs is developed nations to join the regime and invest on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and will adversely affect developing yet high per capital emitter nations. 167 Mumma and Hodas, supra note 166, at 640. 168 The three groups of nations are countries with (1) historically low responsibility and low potential for future GHG emissions that would be entitled to the highest allocations of emissions (e.g. most African countries, small economies in Asia, and many of the small island states); (2) historically high responsibility for emissions and a high potential for future emissions would be allocated the lowest emissions entitlements (e.g. Annex I countries); and lastly (3) historically low responsibility for GHG emissions but high potential for future GHG emissions will be allocated with moderate emission entitlements (e.g. newly industrializing countries of China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, etc). See Id, at 640-642. 169 Id. 170 Id. still increasing owing to factors like the withdrawal of major emitters, e.g. USA, from assuming any reduction commitment, failure of Kyoto signatory states from meeting their abatement commitment, and the exclusion of some major developing countries from the Kyoto commitment.
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Central to the problem is the meaning given and the actions that follow the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" since Kyoto was ratified. 173 Developing nations are asserting that all major GHG-emitting nations have a duty to protect and take preventive or corrective action because they caused the degradation, benefited from past pollution, and currently possess technological and financial advantages to address the problem. 174 Some developed countries, like the US, however, urge that all major GHG emitters, like China, India and Brazil should assume commitments. 175 Parties to the Montreal Protocol negotiating table overcame the North-South division by including the common but differentiated responsibility principle based on which all parties assume responsibility but developed nations incur more (differentiated) obligations. 176 Accordingly, developing nations were allowed to delay the freeze and phase-out of ODSs for ten years, and the Montreal Protocol established and successfully implemented financial assistance and technology transfer schemes. 177 The inclusion of such provisions was "an essential element of the strong consensus behind the Montreal Protocol" and forced China, India and Brazil to join the regime. 178 Theoretically, the climate change regime gives due recognition to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility same as that of the ozone regime. 179 First, the UNFCCC and subsequent negotiations provide a mechanism for financial assistance and transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing nations. 180 Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol excludes developing nations from any binding emission reduction and even creates the CDM that will assist developing nations in meeting the cost of adaptation.
181 Yet all these incentives are too little to attract meaningful participation of developing nations.
182 As a result, many writers agree that Kyoto's commitments are "too little, too fast" or insufficient to avert the urgent problem, and insist on developing nations to play a more significant role over time.
183
To secure meaningful participation of developing nations, additional incentives are recommended by different scholars. Stewart and Wiener recommended (1) a streamlined CDM; 184 (2) voluntary participation in emissions trading without emission quotas; (3) mechanisms for voluntary accession to the emissions quota system; and (4) automatic graduation to the quota system given particular per capita incomes having been reached, or an income threshold above which nations must take on emission commitments.
bound by some technology standards (where the diffusion of these technologies would be financed by industrialized countries) are forwarded. 186 In addition, the fact that any future negotiated outcomes are perceived as being fair to all parties serves as a self-incentive mechanism.
187
On the other hand, many ratifying Annex-I nations, including Canada, Japan and the European Union, are skeptical about meeting their commitment in the first reporting years.
188 Different factors contribute to this, including the lack of accurate emission baselines, unequal advantages of nations when 1990 is taken as a baseline and emission leakage. 189 With regard to unequal advantages, countries like Russia whose emission is reduced since 1990 benefit thereof while others such as the US whose emission increased in the past decades are at a disadvantage.
Yet, the atmosphere is a global commons that the world community should protect collectively thereby avoiding the 'tragedy of the commons '. 190 In the course of struggling to overcome a tragic outcome, equity issues, like free riding and the inequitable distribution of cost and benefits of collective action, pose difficulties for numerous nations.
191 Hence, the existence of a strong legal regime (that brings all nations towards collective actions driven by gains and demonstrable net benefits, and perceived equitable apportionment of burdens) is indispensable.
192
To combat the problem of free-riding that plagues efforts to address this global concern, positive incentives for participation and compliance should be accompanied by credible and sufficiently severe disincentives. 193 Hence, reciprocity or reciprocal measures, financial penalties and self-punishment and trade restriction that contributed to the success of the ozone regime could be adopted. 194 The climate regime, however, does not include any of these trade measures that have partly contributed for the withdrawal of the US, failure of signatory states from meeting reduction commitments, failure of developing nations to assume any responsibility, and fueled arguments by industry blocking coalitions regarding anti-competitiveness and leakage. 195 The fact that ODSs are man-made chemicals produced for industrial use while greenhouse gases are mostly industrial byproducts emitted as externalities of certain processes will complicate the latter and might conflict with the GATT.
196 Consequently, redesigning the climate change regime to include trade restrictions and integrating the two competing realms of international trade and environmental law is necessary. 194 Id, at 20-22. Though there was not any practical trade restriction in ozone regime, the belief that trade would be restricted if countries failed to participate had promoted participation by providing market incentives to join and prevented nonparties from enjoying a competitive advantage and thus deterred leakage of CFC production facilities to non-parties. In addition, legal expert from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") secretariat affirmed that the trade restrictions under Montreal were permitted. Benedick, supra note 4, at 91; 195 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 842. 196 Thus, climate change negotiators cannot follow the example of the ozone regime and place restrictions on the trading of the offending substance itself. Trade restrictions in the climate change regime will have to be placed primarily on products with production processes that emit greenhouse gases. This will not only be more difficult to monitor, but will also run into challenges under the World Trade Organization ("WTO") system, which tends to disfavor restrictions based on differences in production processes. Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 843 mentioning David Victor, The 'target and timetable' approach of the ozone regime, which is not well designed in the climate change regime, was very useful by sending a regulatory signal to CFC producers that investment in alternatives would be profitable.
198
Instead of the short-sighted emissions target, future climate change negotiations should devise a long-term 'target and timetable' that will send an accurate message to industries. It is also important to provide industries with positive market incentives, disable their position by breaking up blocking coalitions, and delegitimize industry discourse for minimizing its pressure. 199 Hence, governments are called upon to adequately respond to the rhetoric of industrial opposition in the climate regime with media campaigns regarding its science, adverse effects, economic competitiveness etc and device means to deal with free riders. Since lack of public concern can pressurize national governments from assuming responsibilities, norm-building efforts on the climate change issue must be developed.
200
Norm-building activities, efforts toward industry fragmentation, 201 and more state and federal climate change legislation could potentially result in U.S. 198 Ozone regime clearly determined the phase-out schedule of ODS and producers know that these products will not survive in the market unless changed by its substitutes. This triggered CFC producing industries to get together in Washington only four months after the negotiation of Montreal to exchange information and invest on research and development for the invention of substitutes. Huge amount of many are invested for it by different companies to produce competitive or lowpriced CFC substitutes where DuPont alone invested $30 million on research and development of CFC substitutes. Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 810; Lisa Schenck, supra note 42; Benedick, supra note 4, at 6, 47, 53; Wettestad, supra note 136, at 132 and 137 199 Laura Thoms, supra note 3, at 846. Unlike the ozone regime where industries like DuPunt were in the forefront for finding substitutes and mobilizing the public against CFC, industrial rhetoric is going the opposite direction in the climate change regime. As Thoms observes, "industry climate change rhetoric has held a privileged position; themes of scientific uncertainty, economic disaster, and the threat of leakage and loss of competitive advantage to developing nations have pervaded public discourse and prevented U.S. action." 200 It has been mentioned that British industries have started this task by singling out carbon dioxide emissions as the environmental "bad." Thus, Amerada Hess is selling zero carbon gasoline and the Carbon Trust has begun to develop zero carbon labels for industrial products, both with the intention of using the term "zero carbon" as a tool for gaining a marketing advantage. See Id, 851-52; last visited on August 27, 2010; Michael Grubb et al., (1999) . The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment 73, at 258-60. 201 Under the disguise of scientific uncertainty, economic disaster, and the threat of leakage and loss of competitive advantage to developing nations, industrial rhetoric accession to the climate change regime at least after 2012. 202 However, looking at the urgency of action required of nations "successful global action will depend upon nations' successes in reaching definitional agreement than in crafting theoretical justifications for continued inaction." 203 Hence, emission reduction targets that are modest in the short-term but that steadily increase in stringency; mechanisms such as growth targets intended to increase developing country participation over time; and the use of market-based instruments are devices that can achieve, if implemented successfully, climate goals at relatively low cost. 
Economic Assistance and Technology Transfer
The issue of financial aid to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation of climate change problems were high since the UNFCCC negotiation. Hence, under the UNFCCC, developed nations agreed to make available "new and additional financial resources" to developing countries "on a grant or concessional basis" or through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels which is operational through Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 205 GEF, the financial administrator for climate change regime, operates under regular replenishments of its GEF Trust Fund by donor countries for three to four years. 206 In addition to its Trust Fund, the GEF manages two special climate-related funds established under the Bonn/Marrakesh agreements: the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) 207 and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). 208 The fourth and related fund attached to Kyoto under the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF) which is established under the Bonn/Marrakesh package to provide funding for concrete adaptation projects and programs in member developing countries from the 'share of proceeds' from CDM. 209 To strengthen such funds, parties in the Bonn Declaration agreed "to contribute a total of USD 410 million per year by 2005 with this level to be reviewed again in 2008" and such fund to be directed towards the SCCF, the LDCF or the KPAF. 210 But so far, as of January 2009, only USD 278 million has been given to the first two funds, i.e. SCCF and LDCF, by donor countries, but nothing to the KPAF due to the contentions over its administration. 211 Moreover, though parties are duty bound to communicate such financial information related to implementation, lack of transparency, inadequacy of information and sometimes absence of the same and non-existence of official Thoms, supra 218 Accordingly, "developing countries agree to take measurable, reportable, and verifiable actions regarding emissions, on the condition that developed countries offer assistance to them with measurable, reportable, and verifiable financing, technology, and capacity building." 219 However, implementation is yet in its infant stage owing to different factors, including the potential conflict with international trade agreements. 220 Although CDM is not a mechanism meant for technology transfer, developing countries can benefit from technology transfer as a side effect. 221 The establishment of the Montreal Multilateral Fund, proportionate contribution by developed signatory states, technology transfer schemes implemented in most developing counties, like China, Brazil and India, and technical assistance delivered across the world in the ozone protection regime contributed to the rapid phase-out or reduction of many ODSs. 222 The financial assistance and technology transfer scheme built into the climate regime, however, is far from being comprehensive, sufficient and attractive. 223 Problems ranging from lack of commitment from donors, absence of comprehensive and effective institutions to administer climate change funds (many less effective funds are created compared to the single Montreal Multilateral Fund in the ozone regime), challenges posed by international trade, and lack of sufficient funds (which of course is much more than what was required by the ozone regime) prevent the mechanisms from lending much support to the climate change regime. 
Enhance Political Commitment
Given the degree of climate change problems, Anthony Giddens explains that, "at present we have no effective politics of climate change, especially at a national level [strong enough to resist the challenge from home] where much of the action must happen." 225 Similarly, Leo Brincat is skeptical about the existence of strong political will that would lead to a long lasting climate agreement in the near future. 226 Only stronger and credible leadership and better communication, higher sense of social justice between all the parties concerned, and the integration of international commitments in the national legislation and effective implementation of the same would bring the long awaited change in the climate regime. 227 Various political analysts describe the existing political system and commitment too weak to bring the required change in the climate change regime, and suggest an increased role for the state. 228 To achieve such a role, some prefer 'ensuring state' over 'enabling state'. 229 The difference is that in the 'enabling state' system, state machineries are confined to stimulate others to act and let them go on with it while in the 'ensuring state' system, state machineries are expected to make sure that processes achieve certain defined outcomes, like emission reduction targets. 230 It is also noted that good democratic leadership, motivated by 'deliberative democracy', should not be confined to policymaking alone but should also educate constituents about pressing issues such as climate change, that may not be apparent to them. 231 Changes in national leadership also apathetically influences the degree of political commitment a nation assumes whereas the presence of continuous and uninterrupted domestic policies play a significant role for the effective realization of international obligations and long term objectives. 232 This is because when obligations such as commitments towards climate change mitigation are particularly onerous, individual nations will adhere to them "only insofar as those nations perceive that positive net benefits...will be forthcoming." 233 For instance, fluctuation in the national policy of the US due to changes in political administration has prevented it from assuming a leadership role while it is the largest GHG emitter. 234 Similarly, changes in government policies are affecting projects to be implemented in GHG emission mitigation in Germany and Canada.
Held and Hervey recommend multiple tasks both for individual states (developing and developed) and the international community to transform global climate change politics. 236 They suggest that, individual states should garner their governance towards the broadening and deepening of the deliberative process, transform private preferences via a process of deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test, continually involve citizens and civil society in the making and delivery of policy, create leadership that confronts narrow interests, and set out compelling scientific and economic case for action. 237 They also underline that the international community should promote inclusive and broadly representative global decision-making channels, assist developing countries to access the necessary resources, capacity and technology for mitigation and adaptation, broaden the existing mandate of the GEF, and increase the status and responsibility of the UNEP by upgrading it onto a specialized UN agency. 238 Some political leaders mention factors like scientific uncertainty, 'tragedy of the commons' or the free-rider problem as a pretext to veil the immense challenges they face from home, i.e. the public, large corporations and labor associations. 239 Scientific uncertainty about climate change cannot, however, serve as a justification because the principle of precaution obliges them to act regardless of the degree of scientific certainty or estimated cost. 240 global and national politics was not a stiff challenge to the ozone regime. 241 Acting even during scientific uncertainties was the center of the ozone regime as nations agreed to reduce production and consumption of ODS at a time when there were many unanswered questions in science, such as the uncertainty regarding the existence of substitutes for many uses of ODS.
242

Conclusion
The high economic cost of reducing GHG emissions, few scientific uncertainties, lack of feasible and low-cost energy substitutes, and the allocation in share of responsibilities for developed and developing nations are the principal impediments against global consensus in the climate change regime. The fact that some developing nations have become high emitters as well as major economic competitors of developed nations has contributed to the problem. As a result, some developed nations like the US have failed to assume responsibility in the Kyoto Protocol claiming that high emitter developing nations like India, China and Brazil should also assume reduction commitments. This poses a formidable challenge in the consensus (that is long overdue) toward solving the problem of climate change.
The ozone layer regime has, however, successfully resolved the North-South dichotomy by allocating a fair share of responsibility to both groups and implementing the same, which can also be adopted in the climate change regime. It is important to note that there exists a very clear difference between ozone and climate problems, and hence mechanisms devised under the Montreal regime cannot be directly transplanted to the climate change regime. But, these good practices can be taken as lessons in the design of future agreements in the climate regime.
As discussed above, sequential approach to developing nations, enhancing participation and compliance, redesigning the financial assistance and technology transfer regimes, and re-structuring the global politics of climate change are some of the solutions that can positively contribute towards an effective climate change regime. This enhances the applicability of the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' and allocates equitable share of responsibilities both for the developed, emitter developing and non-emitter developing nations. Accordingly, developed nations are expected to assume 241 Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra Shende, Durwood Zaelke, (2008 immediate reduction commitments, pledge economic assistance and facilitate technology transfer to developing nations under the condition that developing nations will assume responsibility later. Under such schemes, developing nations will not be totally relieved from commitment but will assume some responsibility based on their historic share of responsibility, economic capacity, amount of current emission and rank on the human development index. 243 Meanwhile, the politics of climate change need to be redesigned and local governments should enhance the awareness of their public, industry and labor associations; they should also stand firmly against pressures on the climate regime. 244 Adequate fund is apparently needed for research and development towards renewable (and low-cost) energy alternatives and minimizing transition costs. Working toward energy alternatives is underway in both developed and developing nations 245 as an integral part of the green movements in all countries. These pursuits indeed mark the advent of new value systems and development paradigms the pace of which determine the prospects and magnitude of achievements in the climate change regime.
■
